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Abstract
This article systematically estimates the allcrcative efficiency losses in the U.S. fmd and
tobacco manufacturing industries under alternative oligopoly pricing regimes using a formal model
of oligopoly. Using 1987 data for 44 industries and an industry-wide oligopoly pricing scheme,
these losses were estimated at approximately 3% of sales--2% in the food industries and I !)~o inthe
tobacco industries. Five additional oligopolypricingregimes, four of which are price leaderships,
are simulated and their results compared and tested relative to the industry-wide pricing regime.
Findings underscore the importance of cost structure assumptions and that the impact of the type
of oligopoly behavior assumed is not as dramatic when differences in demand and cost
specifications are smoothed out.
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Introduction
Accurate estimation of allocative efficiency
losses due to oligopolistic behavior is crucial
because the allocation of antitrust enforcement
efforts is closely related to such estimates (Preston
and Connor, 1992). Consequently, there is a vast
amount of literature measuring welfare losses due to
oligopoly power in the U.S. manufacturing sector;
however, there are often contradictory findings
regarding the magnitude of these losses. For
example, Siegfried and Tiemann (1974) concluded
that welfare losses in the U.S. manufacturing sector
were negligible, while Cowling and Mueller (1978)
arrived at much larger estimates for the sector.
Such contradictory findings are also common in the
U.S. food and tobacco manufacturing sector.
Differences in production, demand, and
pricing behavior assumptions used in this literature
have led to quite divergent allocative efficiency
results for the U.S. food manufacturing industries.
Gisser (1982) estimates oligopoly welfare losses to
be well below one percent of industry sales and thus
opposes government intervention, while Winner
(1989) estimates these losses to exceed five percent
of sales, questioning the performance of these
industries. More recently, Bhuyan and Lopez
(1993) and Connor and Peterson (1994) presented
additional estimates of the oligopoly welfare losses
in the U.S. food processing sector and found a wide
spectrum of estimates for the same industries. For
example, according to the simulation results of
Connor and Peterson, the welfare loss estimates in
the food industry (SIC 20) ranged from 0.2 percent
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to an impossibly high of 289 percent of sales, In
spite of the apparent contradictions in empirical
evidence, the current literature lacks a consistent
comparison of welfare losses due to alternative
oligopoly pricing regimes while smoothing out the
differences due to demand and cost specification
assumptions.
The objective of this article is to
systematically estimate allocative efficiency losses
in the U.S. food and tobacco manufacturing
industries under alternative oligopoly pricing
regimes stemming from the same model.1 This is
necessary in order to focus on the impact of such
pricing behavior on welfare loss by overcoming a
common drawback of the current literature -
comparing estimates of welfare losses derived from
different models with dissimilar demand and
marginal cost specifications (e.g., Gisser, 1982 vs.
Winner, 1989; Connor and Peterson, 1994). This is
important because, beyond a pedagogical interest,
antitrust policy debates are often based on estimates
of oligopoly welfare losses which are subject to the
researcher’s discretion in adopting model
assumptions. Therefore, using the same core model
to explore the sensitivity of welfare loss estimates to
alternative market and cost structure assumptions is
timely.
The estimates of this study are derived
from a formal model of oligopoly that relies on a
built-in collusion parameter as well as explicit
demand and marginal cost elasticities. The baseline
scenario consists of industry-wide oligopoly pricing
where every firm in the industry uses the same
pricing rule (Winner and St&h], 1992). This is
extended to accommodate price leadership regimes.
Six alternative pricing behaviors are empirically
implemented: the baseline scenario (which uses a
collusion parameter computed from data), industry-
wide Cournot behavior, and four price leadership
scenarios corresponding to Cournot and perfectly
collusive versions of Gisser’s (1982) and Winner’s
(1989) pricing behaviors. Data for 44 food and
tobacco manufacturing industries at the four-digit
SIC level for 1987, the most recently available; are
applied to the models.
Statistical tests of the differences of the
means of the welfare losses reject industry-wide
Cournot and Winner’s collusive price leadership
regimes. It is concluded that although much of the
578
debate on welfare losses in the food and tobacco
manufacturing has been focused on whose estimates
are right, many of the results do not differ greatly
when the type of pricing behavior is taken into
account, ceteris paribus. The results also
underscore the importance of cost structure
assumptions.
The Model
The basic oligopoly model draws from the
work of Dickson and Yu (1989) which is then
extended to the price leadership case. For
numerical convenience, both the perfectly
competitive output and price are indexed to 1. The
industry demand curve is represented by Q = I/Pq;
q >() where Q, P and -qare industry output, output
price and absolute value of the price elasticity of
demand, respectively. The industry marginal cost
(MC) curve is denoted by Q = AKT,where Eis the
marginal cost flexibility.z Following Clarke and






where P,v MCO, H, and IX are oligopoly price,
oligopoly marginal cost, the Hertlndahl index and
the collusion parameter. The collusion parameter
denotes the proportional change in the output of
rivals in response to a proportional change in a
firm’s output. In other words, cx represents the
degree of industry-wide collusion, where Cournot
and perfectly collusive behavior are given by u = O
and ci = 1, respectively. Note that if the industry is
perfectly competitive (SW)), then a = -H/(1 -H) <
0.3
Using the industry marginal cost curve and




can be expressed as
(2)
where QOis oligopoly output. Substituting for P. in
the market demand curve yields
Q,>=;=
( F
q -[H+ct( 1-H)] ::,
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A Harberger (1954) index of welfare IOSS4 (HZ) can
then be expressed as
J(
I
WL= ‘ ‘) (1/Q)~ - QT dQ.
Q. (4)
To extend the basic model to the price
leadership case, consider the case where a subset of
n firms behave as price leaders,s The corresponding
Lerner index for the group of leaders (Q”) can be
expressed as g n=[H’’+an(l - H“)]/qD, where q~ is
the elasticity of the residual demand faced by the
leaders, and other notation is as defined before but
superscripted with n. If the leaders behave as a
Coumot oligopoly among themselves then an = 0,
and if they collude then cd = 1. Following Carbon
and Perloff (1990), the leaders’ residual demand
elasticity can be expressed as q~ = [q +(3(1-
CRn)j/CRn, where CRn is the sales share of the
leaders or n-firm sales concentration ratio and t3is
the fringe firms’ supply elasticity,
Using the previous procedure, the oligopoly
price set by the leaders is given by
P.= ~DQo’”
qD-[H” +a”(l -~”)] “
(5)
The resultant oligopoly output is
[ r
~o= ~D-[H”;o(l-~”)] ::. (6)
As before, QOis then used in equation (4)
in order to compute an index of welfare loss for a
given industty. Note that in both cases, the actual
dollar value of the welfare losses divided by
observed sales is equivalent to the indexed welfare
losses (WL) divided by the indexed sales (P,,QO).
Hence, the actual dollar value of the deadweight
loss is given by W% *WPOQO, where S is the
observed dollar sales.
Consider the implications of Gisser’s
(1982) marginal cost assumptions for the leaders
and fringe firms (8=6=1) vis-a-vis Winner’s (1989)
assumptions E=c0,(3=O).From (6), it is clear that
Gisser assumes the residual demand faced by the
leaders to be more price elastic than in Winner’s
model. Thus, Gisser’s model is less restrictive than
Winner’s under any given collusion parameter in
terms of obtaining positive prices and quantity by
using (5) and (6), since both require q~ to exceed
H’ for the Coumot case and to exceed I for the
collusive price leadership case. This is especially
critical since food industry demands are generally
price inelastic. Likewise, Gisser’s model is also
bound to yield lower estimates of welfare losses
merely due to his marginal cost assumptions which
imply a higher price elasticity of demand facing the
leaders (for the same industry demand) as well as
the fringe firms’ ability to respond to the leaders’
prices in the short run.
Data and Estimation Procedures
Based on equation (4), the computation of
welfare losses using the industry-wide oligopoly
model requires data on q, 6, H, a as well as dollar
sales per indust~. Data for these variables were
collected for 44 industries at the 4-digit SIC level
for 1987, the most recent year available. The
estimates of industry demand elasticity (q) were
taken from Pagoulatos and Sorensen (1986),6 The
values of H and dollar sales were taken from the
1987 Census of Manufacturers. Due to lack of
data, the marginal cost flexibility parameter (E) was
assumed to be equal to infinity across industries
(i.e., constant marginal cost), for the industry-wide
oligopoly cases. Using (1), the parameter a was
estimated by &=(~q -H)/(1 -H), where ~ is the
computed Lemer index.
As in Domowitz, Hubbard, and Peterson
(1986), the Lerner index was computed by
~ =[S+ A1-(W+M+rA)] / (S+Al), where S is dollar
sales, AI is the change in inventories, W and M are
the cost of labor and materials, respectively, r is the
rate of discount, and A is the value of fixed assets.’
The above index is corrected for the opportunity
cost of capital by introducing rA. Based on
previous estimates, it was assumed that rd-1,084
(Atlar, 1994), Data on the value of fixed assets are
obtained from the 1987 Census of Manufacturers.
The above data were applied to equation (4) in
order to compute the oligopoly welfare losses for all
food and tobacco manufacturing industries, here
atter called the baseline scenario,J. Agz and Applied Econ., Decembe~ 1995 580
Five additional scenarios were simulated
corresponding to industry-wide Cournot behavior as
well as Gisser’s and Winner’s price leadership
under Cournot and perfectly collusive regimes.*
Note that Gisser’s (1982) analysis was conducted
for the food industries as a whole (SIC=20) and that
he did not consider the Cournot pricing scheme.
For these price leadership regimes, two
combinations of leaders’ marginal cost flexabilities
and fringe firm supply elasticities are used,
corresponding to Gisser’s and Winner’s
assumptions, Assuming that the largest four firms
are the industry leaders (n4) and that each of these
firms has one-quarter of the total leading four-firm
sales share, then W =H4 =(?.25 and CRn = CR4.
These assumptions are made due to lack of data and
for simplicity. The results are presented below.
Welfare Loss Estimates
The results for the six oligopoly pricing
regimes for the food and tobacco industries at the 4-
digit SIC level are presented in Table 1.9 The
results for these industries at the 2- digit SIC level
were also computed by using the weighted averages
of the 4-digit level estimates, using their dollar sales
as weights.’0
For consistency, the baseline scenario is a
maintained hypothesis throughout the analysis even
though no standard errors can be attached to its
results, That is, the baseline results are treated as
factual and its underlying assumptions (e.g.,
elasticities of demand and cost) are assumed to
remain constant when a changes. Thus, the
simulation of the core model using different
behavioral assumptions should be regarded as
counterfactual experiments, ie., how would welfare
losses change in comparison to the baseline
estimates if a different value of the collusion
parameter is used.
The baseline results suggest that the total
estimated dollar value of welfare losses in these
industries was over $10.13 billion in 1987, which
corresponds to approximately 3V0 of total value of
sales. The welfare losses in the food industries
(SIC 20) amounted to approximately $6.34 billion
or approximately 20/0 of sales. The aggregate
welfare losses in the tobacco industries (SIC 21)
were estimated at $3.94 bi[lion or approximately
I 9’70 of sales. At the 4-digit SIC level, the
estimated losses ranged from 0.14 percent of sales
in the meat packing industry to over 210/0of sales in
the cigarette manufacturing industry.
In terms of the baseline results, the
following industries show significantly higher
welfare losses compared to either the food or the
tobacco industry average: SICS 2021 (creamery
butter), 2043 (cereal preparation), 2082 (malt
beverages), 2099 (miscellaneous foods), 2121
(cigarettes), and 2131 (chewing and smoking
tobacco). Perhaps not surprisingly, most of these
six industries have been the focus of various market
power or antitrust related studies.
Simulating an industry-wide Cournot
assumption generally resulted in lower welfare
losses than the baseline results. For example, the
overall welfare losses were estimated at
approximately 1‘A of 1987 sales for the food
industries, 7°/0 for tobacco manufacturers, and
1.44% for the overall sample (cf., 3% in the
baseline results). For seven industries, the Cournot
assumption did not yield positive prices and quantity
because the industry demand elasticity did not
exceed the Herflndahl index. This, of course, does
not mean that the Cournot assumption is not
justifiable for these industries, but rather that the
assumption does not suit the model and the data for
these seven industries.
As expected, simulation of Gisser’s
Coumot and collusive price leadership models
yielded lower welfare losses than Winner’s results
for the same type of price leadership behavior, For
instance, the Gisser-Coumot regime yields an
overall welfare loss at approximate]yO.71 ‘XOof 1987
sales while the corresponding Willner-Coumot
regime estimate is approximately 1.99°A of sales.
For the collusive price leadership scenarios, Gisser’s
regime yields welfare losses at approximate y 6.59?40
of sales while Winner’s regime yields an estimate
of approximately 14’%of sales. The difference
between Gisser’s and Winner’s welfare loss
estimates underscores the importance of marginal
cost assumptions. Although the cost assumptions in
Winner’s model may be more representative of the
technological differences between the leaders and
fringe firms,11 his model yielded economically
meaningfd solutions for far fewer scenarios: 38 for581 Bhuyan and Lopez: Welfare Losses Under Alternative Oligopoly Regimes
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the quantity-setting Cournot behavior (cf., 44 under
Gisser’s model) and 14 for the collusive leadership
(cf., 32 under Gisser’s model). This illustrates the
restrictiveness of Winner’s marginal cost
assumptions and perhaps the limited applicability of
his pricing regimes to most food and tobacco
industries. To further assess the differences among
the welfare loss estimates, t-tests were conducted to
ascertain whether the weighted means of the welfare
losses estimated under the five simulated alternative
scenarios were significantly different from the
weighted mean welfare losses of the baseline
estimates using matched samples, ]2 Of the five
resultant tests, only the means from Gisser’s
collusive price leadership results (t=1.98 for N=32)
and Winner’s Coumot results (t=l .78 for N=32)
were not statistically different from the baseline
means at the 5’%0level. The null hypotheses that the
means of the remaining three scenarios were not
different from the mean of the baseline estimates
were rejected at the 5°/0 level of significance.
Further t-tests revealed that the means of the four
price leadership regimes were all significantly
different from each other at the 5’%0 level. In sum,J Agr and Applied Econ., Decernbec 1995
we failed to reject the hypothesis that the simulated
Gisser-collusion and Willner-Cournot results are
significant]y different from our baseline results.
However, our results significantly differ from the
industry-wide Cournot results as well as from the
Winner’s collusive price leadership results.
It should be noted that except for the
baseline scenario, the other five oligopoly pricing
schemes are calibrated with external assumptions
about key parameters such as the collusion
parameter, Such calibration/simulation was
necessary due to the lack of econometrically
estimated equivalent parameters. For improved
estimation of allocative efficiency losses, statistical
estimates of the cost and demand structure
parameters will be required instead of the current
practice of arbitrarily assuming their values,
particularly for cost parameters.
Concluding Remarks
Based on the baseline scenario which uses
collusion parameters computed from data, allocative
efficiency losses from industry-wide oligopoly
pricing in the U.S. food and tobacco manufacturing
industries are estimated at approximately 370 of
sales in 1987. In terms of the food industries alone,
the estimated losses amount to slightly over 270 of
sales, The estimated welfare losses for the tobacco
manufacturing industries, on the other hand, amount
to 19’%of their value of shipments. Over the 44
four-digit SIC level industries, these losses ranged
from 0.14 percent of sales in the meat packing
industry to 21.56°/0 of sales in the cigarette
manufacturing industry,
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Compared to the baseline estimates,
simulating an industry-wide Coumot behavior
assumption led to lower welfare loss estimates,
while collusive price leadership regimes showed
substantially higher losses. Moreover, a comparison
of the baseline welfare loss estimates with the five
simulated alternative oligopoly pricing schemes
showed that the industry-wide Cournot and
Winner’s collusive price leadership behavior may be
unlikely. However, we failed to reject the
hypothesis that the Gisser-collusion and the Willner-
Coumot results are significantly different fi-omour
baseline results. Overall, comparison of simulated
alternative oligopoly pricing schemes underscores
the importance of behavioral and cost structure
assumptions in determining the magnitude of
allocative etliciency losses.
Some limitations of the analysis may be
important. Like other similar studies, the current
welfare loss estimates are subject to the functional
forms assumed for cost and demand. In this regard,
Shapiro (1989), Winner and Stahl (1992), and
Connor and Peterson (1994) indicate that the
outcome of oligopolistic interactions is very
sensitive to the underlying model and, in particular,
to the functional form of demand. In addition to the
static nature of the results, another limitation is the
exclusion of possible market failures, such as the
externality (health) costs of cigarette and alcohol
consumption, since oligopoly price increases may be
welfare enhancing by partially internalizing those
costs. Finally, like many other industries, the food
and tobacco manufacturing industries are
increasingly becoming global in nature, advocating
a model with open trade.
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Endnotes
1. Economic efficiency encompasses both allocative and technical efficiency. In a dynamic context,
productivity gains may accrue. due to supranormal profits from market power, in consonance with the
Schumpeterian hypothesis. The Demsetz critique states that a price-cost margin may reflect lower marginal
costs rather than higher prices due to a greater efficiency by the monopolist (Demsetz, 1973). Of course,
there are also plenty of studies that refute the above arguments. In the food industries, only the work of
Gisser (1982) incorporates productivity gains.
2. Technically speaking, the MC elasticity is the inverse of E, i.e., the percent change in MC given a one
percent change in output (see for example, Ferguson, 1979, p. 159). Many studies of oligopoly welfare
losses denote c as the marginal cost elasticity. Under competitive conditions, s denotes the price elasticity
of supply.
3. It is instructive to compare Appelbaum’s (1982) conjectural variations elasticity and Clarke and Davis’
(1982) collusion parameter. It can be easily shown that, by using the Clarke and Davis parameter (et), the
conjectural variations elasticity of firm i can be expressed as ~, = s, + CX(I- s), where (3,= conjectural
variation elasticity of firm i ands, = market share of firm i. The weighted average of ~, for N firms (using
s, as weights) can be expressed by ~ =H +a ( I - H), which is the numerator of equation (1).
4. The Harberger loss represents the social value of output not produced due to monopoly or oligopoly
power. There is abundant evidence that Harberger losses underestimate the true welfare losses because they
exclude wasteful, rent seeking activities such as lobbying (Tullock, 1967). In a dynamic context, if
productivity or efficiency gains occur as a consequence of market power, such gains may offset static
deadweight losses (Gisser, 1982). Thus, there is possibility that Harberger or deadweight losses may
overestimate the social cost of oligopoly power in a static model, It is beyond the scope of this article to
correctly calculate this augmented social costs or to estimate possible welfare gains from induced
technological innovations.
5. Census data (e.g., four-firm concentration relative to sales in the data appendix) and previous studies
(e.g., Gisser, 1986) suggest that price leadership behavior is possible in many industries which consist of
a few large firms and competitive fringe firms. The dominant firms may ignore the pricing behavior of the
rest of the leaders (assuming more than one leader), i.e., Cournot condition, or collude among themselves.
These two extreme behavioral assumptions provide convenient points of reference for the analysis presented
here.
6. For SICS 2048, 2074, 2076, 2084, and 2086, the elasticities reported by Heien and Pompelli (1989) and
Gould, Cox, and Perali (199 1) were used because of the low statistical significance of the corresponding
demand elasticities estimated by Pagoulatos and Sorensen (1986) for those industries.
7. Economists often use aggregate data to construct a measure of the Lerner index known as price-cost
margin (PCM) which is commonly defined as PCM = (sales - cost of labor - cost of materials) / sales
following Collins and Preston (1969). Domowitz, Hubbard, and Petersen (1986) included the change in
inventories (AI) in the traditional PCM definition to reduce the difference between the value of sales and
the value of output. Scherer and Ross (1990) suggest that in order to use the PCM as a close proxy for the
Lerner index, researchers should include some measure of capital cost. The definition of Lerner index used
in this study is a modified PCM measure that reduces the difference between the value of sales and the
value of output as well as includes an opportunity cost of capital.587 Bhuyan and Lopez: Weljare Losses Under Alternative Oligopoly Regimes
8. Clearly the model is not applicable to simulate industry-wide perfect collusion (a = l) since industry
demand is price inelastic throughout. Likewise, the model to simulate perfect collusion for price leaders
(a.”=1) is applicable only if the residual demand is price elastic. Linear demand curves would provide
mathematical solutions for this type of collusion but they usually lead to abnormally high welfare losses (see
for example Connor and Peterson’s (1994) results).
9. Note that five four-digit SIC categories were merged: (i) poultry and egg processing (SIC=2016 &
2017); (ii) frozen fmit and vegetables and juices (2037& 2038); (iii) flour and grain milling (2041 & 2045);
(iv) bread and bakery (205 1,2052 & 2053); and (v) sugar (2061, 2062 & 2063).
10. Note that the computed collusion parameter (&) and the estimated weighted conjectural variation
elasticity (~) appear to provide a reasonable indication of the degree of collusion in the U.S. food and
tobacco manufacturing industries, Appelbaum (1982) estimated the conjectural variation elasticity for the
tobacco industry for 1947-1971 at ~=0.40, on average, which is close to the (~=0,363) presented in the data
appendix. Azzam and Pagoulatos (1990) estimated ~ for the meat packing industry at 0.223 while Schroeter
(1988) estimated ~=0.025 for the beef-packing industry. Our estimate of ~=0.044 for the meat-packing
industry falls within the range of these two results.
1I. Gisser’s (1986) assumption that both the leaders and fringe firms have the same supply elasticity
implies that both groups of firms have more or less identical technologies which makes it unlikely that a
few of them will assume the role of active leaders. Winner (1989) assumed inelastic supply for ftinge firms
while the leaders’ supply was perfectly elastic, i.e., there were technological differences between the leaders
and the rival fringe firms.
12. A comparative study of difference of means of two populations is undertaken to test whether they are
significantly different from each other (Neter, Wasserman, and Whitmore, 1993, chapter 14). For our
purpose, because all the estimates presented in Table 1 came from the same population, a matched sample
test procedure is applied and industry sales weighted means were used. Tests using unweighed means or
the dollar welfare losses led to very similar results as those reported for the weighted means.